[
    {
        "role": "user",
        "content": "in%20ms%20word%20365%2C%20an%20update%20just%20locked%20a%20word%20doc%20that%20i%20am%20working%20on.%20how%20do%20i%20unlock%20it%3F%20i%20am%20blind%20and%20use%20jaws%20for%20windows."
    },
    {
        "role": "assistant",
        "content": "Here are some steps to help you *unlock* a Word document in Microsoft 365, especially when it suddenly becomes locked by an update. Since you're using JAWS, I'll include the key shortcuts and describe what you\u2019ll hear or see. If any of these don't match exactly, let me know \u2014 Word versions vary slightly.\n\n---\n\n## Common Ways a Word Doc Gets Locked\n\nFirst, it's useful to check which kind of locking you\u2019re experiencing:\n\n- The document is in **Protected View**, often because it came from the internet, an email, or OneDrive.\n- The document has been marked as **Read-Only** or **Marked as Final**.\n- You've opened it on a shared drive or cloud storage (OneDrive, SharePoint) and Word thinks it's in use elsewhere or by \u201cyou\u201d already.\n- Editing restrictions are in place (\u201cRestrict Editing\u201d protection) possibly with a password.\n\nKnowing which one applies will guide which method will work.\n\n---\n\n## What to Try: Unlocking Methods\n\nHere are steps, with keyboard shortcuts and what to listen for. Try them in this order.\n\n---\n\n### 1. Exit Protected View (if active)\n\nWhen you open a file in Protected View, you\u2019ll hear something like \u201cRead-Only mode\u201d or \u201cProtected View\u201d in the title bar. To fix:\n\n- Press **ALT + F** to open the File menu.\n- Use arrow keys until you get to **Info**, press *Enter*.\n- Look for a button that says **Enable Editing** (or something like \u201cEdit Anyway\u201d), then press *Enter*. ([support.microsoft.com](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/office/enable-editing-in-your-document-22caa80b-4552-495d-8fa1-f874461a13a0?utm_source=openai))\n\nIf prompted that this file is from the Internet or an attachment, Word will explicitly say it's in Protected View.\n\n---\n\n### 2. If Document Is \u201cMarked as Final\u201d\n\n- You may hear a banner saying \u201cMarked as Final\u201d when you open the document. Word does this to discourage edits. ([cocosenor.com](https://www.cocosenor.com/articles/office/word-document-is-locked-for-editing-how-to-unlock.html?utm_source=openai))\n- Press **ALT + R** to go to the Review tab.\n- Use **TAB** or arrow keys to reach **Protect** or **Restrict Editing**, then Enter.\n- In the Restrict Editing pane (you\u2019ll hear \u201cRestrict Editing\u201d) move focus to where it says **Stop Protection**, then press *Enter*. If the document is \u201cMarked as Final,\u201d you should see an **Edit Anyway** button instead of Stop Protection. ([flavor365.com](https://flavor365.com/unlock-any-word-document-your-step-by-step-fix/?utm_source=openai))\n\n---\n\n### 3. If Editing Is Restricted (\u201cRestrict Editing\u201d feature)\n\nIf editing is restricted:\n\n- Press **ALT + R** to go to Review.\n- Navigate to **Restrict Editing** via **Protect**.\n- In the restriction pane, listen for the \u201cStop Protection\u201d option. If you've enforced protection with a password, Word will prompt you for the password. ([waynegov.com](https://www.waynegov.com/DocumentCenter/View/2616/How-to-unprotect-a-Word-document?utm_source=openai))\n\nIf there\u2019s no password, Stop Protection will immediately lift the restriction. If there *is* a password, you\u2019ll need it. If you don\u2019t know it, the following method might help.\n\n---\n\n### 4. Create a New Copy to Remove Certain Locks\n\nIf you can\u2019t stop protection (or don\u2019t have the password), you could make a copy of the doc.\n\n- With the document open, press **ALT + F**, then hit **A** to go \u201cSave As.\u201d\n- Use arrow keys and tabs to go into **Tools** in the Save As dialog, then choose **General Options**.\n- Check if \u201cRead-only recommended\u201d is selected; if so, uncheck it.\n- If there is a \u201cPassword to modify\u201d field filled in, clear it. Then save the new copy. ([cocosenor.com](https://www.cocosenor.com/articles/office/word-document-is-locked-for-editing-how-to-unlock.html?utm_source=openai))\n\nThat new copy should be editable unless there\u2019s deeper protection.\n\n---\n\n### 5. If the Document Is Locked \u201cby You\u201d on a Network or Cloud Location\n\nSometimes Word thinks the file is still open \u2014 maybe in OneDrive or SharePoint \u2014 or a background process didn\u2019t close properly. Here\u2019s what to do:\n\n- Make sure Word is fully closed. You might have to press **CTRL+SHIFT+ESC** to open Task Manager, then check for any Word processes and end them.\n- If it's on OneDrive or SharePoint, pause syncing briefly, close Word, then reopen and try editing. ([techyorker.com](https://techyorker.com/how-to-unlock-a-word-document-that-is-locked-for-editing-by-me-a-guide/?utm_source=openai))\n- If nothing works, copy the file (in File Explorer), rename it, then open the copy \u2014 this sometimes breaks stale locks. ([gentext.ai](https://gentext.ai/guides/en/fix-word-document-locked-by-another-user/?utm_source=openai))\n\n---\n\n## JAWS-Specific Tips\n\nBecause you're using JAWS, here are some things to do and listen for:\n\n- JAWS will often read out the ribbon tabs. Use **ALT** + letter keys (like ALT + R) to jump to Review, ALT + F for File.\n- When menus or dialogs open, JAWS will say the name of the item in focus \u2014 \u201cRestrict Editing pane,\u201d \u201cStop Protection button,\u201d \u201cEnable Editing.\u201d\n- If something is off-screen (like a pane that opens on the right), you can press **F6** to cycle between panes or areas.\n- If you want Word\u2019s ribbon feedback verbalized, press **Insert + 9** to toggle \u201cloud verbose\u201d mode so you can hear more detailed descriptions. (Depends on your JAWS setup).\n\n---\n\nIf you tell me exactly what the message says (\u201cProtected View,\u201d \u201cRead-Only,\u201d \u201cSelection is locked,\u201d etc.), I can give more precise steps for *your specific lock*. Do you want to try these now and tell me what you hear, so I can guide you further?"
    },
    {
        "role": "user",
        "content": "what%20has%20a%20computer%20scientist%20named%20Haldiman%20in%20the%20US%20said%20about%20the%20secuirty%20of%20internet%20voting%3F"
    },
    {
        "role": "assistant",
        "content": "The person you\u2019re probably asking about is **J. Alex Halderman** (John Alexander Halderman), a computer scientist at the University of Michigan. He\u2019s one of the leading experts in voting security. Below are key things he has said and shown about the security of Internet voting, drawn from his research, public comments, and recent testimony, along with what they mean in practice.\n\n---\n\n## Who Is Halderman\n\n- Halderman is Professor of Computer Science and Engineering at University of Michigan, and Director of its Center for Computer Security and Society. ([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/J._Alex_Halderman?utm_source=openai))  \n- His research focuses heavily on voting systems, election security, privacy, and how technology interacts with law and public policy. ([usenix.org](https://www.usenix.org/conference/enigma2016/conference-program/presentation/halderman?utm_source=openai))  \n\n---\n\n## What He Has Said About Internet Voting Security\n\nHalderman has repeatedly warned about serious vulnerabilities and unacceptable risks in Internet voting systems. Key points include:\n\n1. **Fundamental security and privacy risks**  \n   In his 2016 presentation \u201cInternet Voting: What Could Go Wrong?\u201d, he pointed out that Internet voting raises \u201csome of the most difficult challenges in computer security,\u201d specifically because it must protect not only against outside hacking, but also protect the secrecy of the ballot. He found \u201cstaggering gaps in system designs and operational procedures,\u201d which let attackers change votes, violate privacy, or disrupt results. ([usenix.org](https://www.usenix.org/conference/enigma2016/conference-program/presentation/halderman?utm_source=openai))\n\n2. **No current Internet voting system is safe enough**  \n   Halderman, along with other election security scientists, has said that with current technology it's not possible to meet all requirements: confidentiality, authenticity, reliable voter authentication, verifiability, and a trustworthy audit trail. For example, an analysis of Australia\u2019s iVote system uncovered vulnerabilities severe enough to allow vote manipulation or privacy violations. ([arxiv.org](https://arxiv.org/abs/1504.05646?utm_source=openai))\n\n3. **Attacks can go undetected until it\u2019s too late**  \n   He has shown in experiments how, in pilot or test deployments, someone entirely outside the system could compromise votes without immediate detection. One famous instance: in a 2010 pilot in Washington, D.C., he and colleagues were able to break in and change votes. The attackers would often only be discovered during the count, by which point fraud would already have happened. ([llnl.gov](https://www.llnl.gov/article/40901/security-risks-and-privacy-issues-are-too-great-moving-ballot-box-internet?utm_source=openai))\n\n4. **Internet voting makes election systems large targets**  \n   The more people vote over the Internet, the larger and more appealing a target elections become for attackers. Once connected to the Internet, systems are exposed to threats ranging from malware, denial of service attacks, insider threats, and nation-states. ([mgaleg.maryland.gov](https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/meeting_material/2024/w%26m%20-%20133511156103806553%20-%20Halderman%20-%20Internet%20Voting%20%28MD%2C%20January%202024%29.pdf?utm_source=openai))\n\n5. **Risk of false or unprovable fraud claims**  \n   Even if an attack has not happened, if a system is insecure, then false claims of hacking or manipulation are more plausible \u2014 and more damaging to public confidence in election outcomes. When election integrity is questioned, it\u2019s harder to restore trust if people believe vulnerabilities exist and weren\u2019t addressed. ([mgaleg.maryland.gov](https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/meeting_material/2024/w%26m%20-%20133511156103806553%20-%20Halderman%20-%20Internet%20Voting%20%28MD%2C%20January%202024%29.pdf?utm_source=openai))\n\n6. **Bringing technology forward\u2014not now, maybe someday**  \n   Halderman has suggested that Internet voting might only be considered in the future, if and when major open problems in cybersecurity are solved\u2014major issues like ensuring voter privacy, secure vote transmission, ability to audit results, trustworthy client devices, etc. But as of his recent testimony (e.g. in Maryland, 2024), we are not there yet. ([mgaleg.maryland.gov](https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/meeting_material/2024/w%26m%20-%20133511156103806553%20-%20Halderman%20-%20Internet%20Voting%20%28MD%2C%20January%202024%29.pdf?utm_source=openai))\n\n7. **Policy recommendations**  \n   To protect elections, Halderman has suggested:\n   - Use paper ballots wherever possible (hand-marked, with physical audit trails). ([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/J._Alex_Halderman?utm_source=openai))  \n   - Routine, independent audits after elections. ([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/J._Alex_Halderman?utm_source=openai))  \n   - Upgrading or replacing obsolete voting machines and equipment with better security hardening. ([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/J._Alex_Halderman?utm_source=openai))  \n   - Applying best practices in cybersecurity (e.g. updating software, ensuring code is auditable, securing both physical and network access). ([usenix.org](https://www.usenix.org/conference/enigma2016/conference-program/presentation/halderman?utm_source=openai))  \n\n---\n\n## Recent Work\n\n- In **January 2024**, Halderman presented to Maryland legislators about Internet voting, where he emphasized that expanding Internet voting increases risk; and that although Internet voting \u201cmay someday\u201d be made secure, that day is not yet here. ([mgaleg.maryland.gov](https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/meeting_material/2024/w%26m%20-%20133511156103806553%20-%20Halderman%20-%20Internet%20Voting%20%28MD%2C%20January%202024%29.pdf?utm_source=openai))  \n- He has joined public calls (with AAAS EPI Center, Verified Voting, etc.) to make decision-makers aware that no current technology offers the secrecy, security, and verifiability required by public elections. ([aaas.org](https://www.aaas.org/news/internet-voting-remains-insecure-says-aaas-epi-center?utm_source=openai))  \n\n---\n\nIf you like, I can pull up *direct quotes* from Halderman with the exact wording he\u2019s used \u2014 might be helpful. Do you want those?"
    },
    {
        "role": "user",
        "content": "what%20has%20he%20said%20about%20the%20use%20of%20a%20ballot-marking%20device%20not%20connected%20to%20the%20internet%20to%20accommodate%20voters%20with%20disabilities%20like%20blind%20voters%3F"
    },
    {
        "role": "assistant",
        "content": "Here\u2019s a closer look at what **J. Alex Halderman** has said about *Ballot Marking Devices* (BMDs) that are *not connected to the internet*, particularly as accommodation tools for voters with disabilities (such as blind voters). The statements come from his technical research, legal testimony, and public reports. Each one has strengths and risks he highlights, especially in relation to accessibility and security.\n\n---\n\n## What Is a BMD (Ballot-Marking Device)\n\nA BMD is a kind of voting machine used *in-person* that helps people mark a paper ballot through assistive technology (touchscreen, audio, etc.). After marking, it prints a paper ballot which is then scanned or deposited like any paper ballot. Some BMDs are designed to be *\u201cair-gapped\u201d*\u2014not connected to the internet during voting\u2014to reduce certain risks. Halderman has discussed these systems many times. ([alumni.umich.edu](https://alumni.umich.edu/michigan-alum/securing-the-vote/?utm_source=openai))\n\n---\n\n## What Halderman Says: Benefits When They Are Offline & Used for Accessibility\n\n1. **Used selectively for voters with disabilities**  \n   Halderman has said that using BMDs *only for accessibility purposes*\u2014that is, when voters need assistive tech to vote independently\u2014is much safer than using them for *all* in-person voters. This means most voters would use hand-marked paper ballots, with BMDs reserved for those who cannot mark ballots by hand. In legal declarations, he emphasizes this as a compromise between accessibility and security. ([gaverifiedvoting.org](https://gaverifiedvoting.org/pdf-litigation/20200901-855_1-Halderman--Repl-Decl-Redacted.pdf?utm_source=openai))\n\n2. **Offline (air-gapped) BMDs reduce exposure**  \n   When BMDs are *not connected to the internet*, certain large-scale attacks become much harder. Halderman has repeatedly pointed out that machines connected to networks pose much higher risks than those isolated. Offline BMDs help limit attack vectors, particularly those that rely on remote access. ([cyberscoop.com](https://cyberscoop.com/election-hacking-voting-machines-alex-halderman/?utm_source=openai))\n\n3. **Paper printouts give a verifiable record**  \n   A major part of his argument is that BMD output must include a paper ballot that the voter can see, verify, and then cast. This ballot must be human-readable (not just a barcode). The paper serves as the ground truth in any audit or recount. Without this, even offline BMDs are problematic. ([alumni.umich.edu](https://alumni.umich.edu/michigan-alum/securing-the-vote/?utm_source=openai))\n\n4. **Security gaps even in offline BMDs**  \n   Halderman doesn\u2019t say that offline BMDs are perfectly safe. In his 2023 \u201cHalderman Report\u201d on Georgia\u2019s Dominion ImageCast X (ICX) BMDs, he found serious vulnerabilities\u2014some of which could be exploited even in air-gapped settings. For example, one vulnerability allows a voter to insert a malicious smart card during the voting session; malware could then spread to other machines or even affect central election management systems. This shows that even offline BMDs must be carefully designed, maintained, and physically secured. ([voterga.org](https://voterga.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/Halderman-Security-Analysis-Dominion-ICX-BMD-.pdf?utm_source=openai))\n\n5. **Voter verification is often weak in practice**  \n   One study Halderman led found that even when voters use BMDs that print a paper ballot, over **93%** of voters fail to notice or report errors printed by the device. That means that the expectation that voters will catch mis-print or mismatches before casting the paper isn\u2019t always met. For blind voters, verifying what the paper says can be especially hard, unless accommodations (audio or tactile) are built in. ([systems.engin.umich.edu](https://systems.engin.umich.edu/stories/new-study-finds-voters-not-detecting-ballot-errors-potential-hacks?utm_source=openai))\n\n---\n\n## What This Means for Blind Voters: Pros & Cons\n\n### Pros\n\n- **Independent Access**: Offline BMDs allow voters who are blind or have visual impairments to vote privately and independently using assistive methods (audio, braille, etc.). This meets accessibility goals that plain paper ballots or optical scanners cannot always meet.  \n- **Privacy & Secrecy When Properly Designed**: If the device produces a paper ballot that is verifiable (including for blind voters), and if the device\u2019s ports and update mechanisms are protected, the risk of remote interference drops.\n\n### Cons / Risks\n\n- **Verification Barrier**: Blind voters may not be able to visually check printed ballots. If the printed ballot is only in human-readable text, audio verification or braille output must be provided. Halderman points out that many BMDs use barcodes for vote scanning\u2014barcodes that the voter usually cannot verify, and which may differ from the human-readable portion. That\u2019s a serious risk. ([cdt.org](https://cdt.org/insights/no-simple-answers-a-primer-on-ballot-marking-device-security-elections/?utm_source=openai))\n\n- **Physical & Operational Vulnerabilities**: Even offline BMDs can be compromised through physical access (USB ports, smart cards, malware via memory devices). These kinds of attacks can be hard to detect. Proper sealing, locking, auditing, and software updates are needed. ([cyberscoop.com](https://cyberscoop.com/election-hacking-voting-machines-alex-halderman/?utm_source=openai))\n\n- **Low Detection of Errors**: The fact that voters rarely detect mismatches in what is printed vs. what was selected means a lot of safety depends on trust in the machine and system, which is fragile. Blind voters especially may be doubly disadvantaged if verification is not accessible. ([systems.engin.umich.edu](https://systems.engin.umich.edu/stories/new-study-finds-voters-not-detecting-ballot-errors-potential-hacks?utm_source=openai))\n\n---\n\n## Halderman\u2019s Suggested Safeguards\n\nFrom what I\u2019ve gathered, here are things Halderman thinks need to be in place if BMDs are to be used safely for voters with disabilities:\n\n- **Paper ballot that voter can verify**: Must include human-readable text; if barcode is used, voters should be able to verify what the barcode means, or audits must check consistency.  \n- **Accessible verification technology**: For blind voters, audio read\u2010outs or tactile options to confirm what\u2019s on the paper before casting.  \n- **Minimize usage to those who need assistive tech**: Use BMDs *as accommodations*, not for everyone, to reduce overall risk.  \n- **Secure device setup and maintenance**: Air-gapping, locking ports, sealing devices, controlling software updates.  \n- **Routine audits and strong monitoring**: Risk-limiting audits, post-election paper audits, checks that what was printed matches what was counted.  \n- **Regular software updates and patching**: Address known vulnerabilities before elections. ([alumni.umich.edu](https://alumni.umich.edu/michigan-alum/securing-the-vote/?utm_source=openai))\n\n---\n\nIf you want, I can pull up a quote from Halderman *specifically*, using language that directly addresses blind or visually-impaired voters and offline BMDs. Would you prefer that?"
    },
    {
        "role": "user",
        "content": "please%20set%20out%20again%20with%20citations%20and%20links%20quotations%20or%20points%20that%20that%20michigan%20professor%20made%20against%20ballot-marking%20devices%20for%20blind%20voters."
    },
    {
        "role": "assistant",
        "content": "Here are key points and direct quotations from Professor J. Alex Halderman regarding **ballot\u2010marking devices (BMDs)**\u2014particularly the risks they pose for *blind or visually impaired* voters\u2014along with links and citations. Much of his criticism deals with how BMDs subvert security when vulnerable components like barcodes and audits are misused, especially since blind voters can\u2019t use standard visual verification.\n\n---\n\n## What Halderman Has Said (with Citations and Quotes)\n\n### 1. Voters Miss Errors on Printed Batches\n\n- In a study by University of Michigan (Matt Bernhard & J. Alex Halderman), voters using BMDs at a mock polling place failed to detect more than **93%** of incorrect print\u2010outs made deliberately by hacked BMDs. ([systems.engin.umich.edu](https://systems.engin.umich.edu/stories/new-study-finds-voters-not-detecting-ballot-errors-potential-hacks?utm_source=openai))  \n- Halderman said:  \n  *\u201cVoters missed more than 93% of the errors.\u201d* ([systems.engin.umich.edu](https://systems.engin.umich.edu/stories/new-study-finds-voters-not-detecting-ballot-errors-potential-hacks?utm_source=openai))  \n- This is especially relevant for blind voters, since visual inspection of human\u2010readable text is the usual way voters verify their ballot, which blind voters can\u2019t perform. The study found even visible mismatches are rarely caught. ([systems.engin.umich.edu](https://systems.engin.umich.edu/stories/new-study-finds-voters-not-detecting-ballot-errors-potential-hacks?utm_source=openai))\n\n### 2. QR Codes That Voters Can\u2019t Verify\n\n- Halderman has pointed out that many BMDs print ballots with a **human\u2010readable summary** and a **barcode/QR code** that actually gets scanned and counted. The problem is that the voter cannot tell whether the QR/ barcode matches what they believe they selected. ([alumni.umich.edu](https://alumni.umich.edu/michigan-alum/securing-the-vote/?utm_source=openai))  \n- From his *2023 Georgia ICX BMD* security analysis:  \n  > \u201cAttackers can cause the BMDs to print ballots with QR codes encoded with selections different from a voter\u2019s actual selections while leaving the human\u2010readable text summary unchanged.\u201d ([systems.engin.umich.edu](https://systems.engin.umich.edu/stories/the-science-behind-election-security?utm_source=openai))  \n- Also:  \n  > \u201cAttacks on the BMDs could cause them to print barcodes that differ from voters\u2019 selections. These changes would be undetectable to voters, who cannot read the encrypted barcodes.\u201d ([voterga.org](https://voterga.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/Public-Halderman-Findings.pdf?utm_source=openai))\n\n### 3. Critical Vulnerabilities in BMDs\n\n- Halderman\u2019s *April 2023 \u201cHalderman Report\u201d* found a number of serious vulnerabilities in Dominion\u2019s ICX BMDs used in Georgia. Some relevant to the blind include:  \n\n  1. An attacker with **brief physical access** can install malware on the BMDs. ([democracydocket.com](https://www.democracydocket.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Order-granting-in-part-and-denying-in-part-motion-for-summary-judgment-.pdf?utm_source=openai))  \n  2. Attackers can alter the **QR code printed on ballots** to change votes without changing the human\u2010readable text. ([voterga.org](https://voterga.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/Public-Halderman-Findings.pdf?utm_source=openai))  \n  3. Audits in Georgia (as of the report) do **not** plan to verify the QR codes or compare them with the human\u2010readable text. This means some classes of attack would escape detection even in audit. ([voterga.org](https://voterga.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/Public-Halderman-Findings.pdf?utm_source=openai))\n\n### 4. General Argument: BMDs as a Compromise\u2014but With Serious Trade-Offs\n\n- Halderman has said that while BMDs are sometimes proposed as a compromise to make voting accessible, they introduce \u201ca potentially vulnerable computer between the voter and the only record of their vote.\u201d ([freespeechforpeople.org](https://freespeechforpeople.org/pbs-newshour-reports-on-the-problems-of-using-touchscreen-ballot-marking-devices/?utm_source=openai))  \n- He\u2019s also noted that defaulting all in-person voting to BMDs (rather than limiting to voters with disabilities) increases risk. In Georgia and South Carolina, for example, BMDs are used by all in\u2010person voters. This amplifies potential problems. ([theworld.org](https://theworld.org/stories/2020/08/17/relying-electronic-voting-machines-puts-us-risk-security-expert-says?utm_source=openai))\n\n---\n\n## Why These Criticisms Particularly Matter for Blind Voters\n\n- The human\u2010readable portion of the ballot (text summary) is essential for verification\u2014but blind voters may not be able to see it. Thus, they may have to rely on **audio read-out or tactile verification**, and those accommodations are often weaker or absent. Halderman emphasizes the mismatch risk is undetectable if blind voters cannot verify the human-readable printout.  \n- Blind voters are especially disadvantaged if the human-readable text does *not* get audited or compared with the QR code, as Halderman\u2019s reports showed is often the case. ([voterga.org](https://voterga.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/Public-Halderman-Findings.pdf?utm_source=openai))  \n- Also, since most voters don\u2019t double-check even visible errors, Halderman warns that the chance of detecting a shift in results due to hacking is very low\u2014so outcomes in close races could be silently compromised. ([systems.engin.umich.edu](https://systems.engin.umich.edu/stories/new-study-finds-voters-not-detecting-ballot-errors-potential-hacks?utm_source=openai))  \n\n---\n\n## Direct Links to Key Reports / Documents\n\n- Halderman\u2019s 2023 *Security Analysis of Georgia\u2019s ImageCast X Ballot Marking Devices* (\u201cHalderman Report\u201d) \u2014 covers many vulnerabilities. ([myemail.constantcontact.com](https://myemail.constantcontact.com/Press-Release---Halderman-Report-on-Georgia-s-Voting-System-Vulnerabilities-Unsealed-by-Federal-Court.html?aid=SbTfM8n4ps4&soid=1109272168263&utm_source=openai))  \n- Study \u201cNot enough voters detecting ballot errors and potential hacks\u201d (Bernhard & Halderman, U. Michigan). ([systems.engin.umich.edu](https://systems.engin.umich.edu/stories/new-study-finds-voters-not-detecting-ballot-errors-potential-hacks?utm_source=openai))  \n- NewsHour/BMD security piece featuring Halderman on the risks when ballots are printed with QR codes inaccessible to voters. ([freespeechforpeople.org](https://freespeechforpeople.org/pbs-newshour-reports-on-the-problems-of-using-touchscreen-ballot-marking-devices/?utm_source=openai))  \n\n---\n\nIf you like, I can extract quotes where Halderman *explicitly mentions blind or visually impaired voters* (with audio/tactile issues)\u2014some of these are more implied, but it's possible there are direct statements. Want me to pull those out?"
    },
    {
        "role": "user",
        "content": "what%20is%20the%20ascii%20code%20for%20a%20hard%20page%20break"
    },
    {
        "role": "assistant",
        "content": "The ASCII code for a \"hard page break\" (also called a *form feed*) is:\n\n- **Decimal:** 12 ([support.microsoft.com](https://support.microsoft.com/en-gb/office/insert-ascii-or-unicode-latin-based-symbols-and-characters-d13f58d3-7bcb-44a7-a4d5-972ee12e50e0?utm_source=openai))  \n- **Hexadecimal:** 0x0C ([ascii-code.com](https://www.ascii-code.com/12?utm_source=openai))  \n- **Character Name:** Form Feed (FF) ([asciify.dev](https://asciify.dev/ascii/whitespace/form-feed?utm_source=openai))  \n- **Control notation:** Often represented as `^L` or `\\f` in many programming languages. ([support.microsoft.com](https://support.microsoft.com/en-gb/office/insert-ascii-or-unicode-latin-based-symbols-and-characters-d13f58d3-7bcb-44a7-a4d5-972ee12e50e0?utm_source=openai))  \n\n---\n\nIf you meant a different kind of \"page break\" (for example, in HTML, PDF, or a print driver), I can also pull up those specific codes."
    },
    {
        "role": "user",
        "content": "what%20is%20the%20qwerty%20code%20for%20a%20hard%20page%20brak"
    },
    {
        "role": "assistant",
        "content": "The \"hard page break\" you\u2019re probably referring to is the one used in word processors (like Microsoft Word) to force the next page. The **standard keyboard (QWERTY) shortcut** for a hard page break is:\n\n**Windows / Linux:**  \nCtrl + Enter ([softwareaccountant.com](https://softwareaccountant.com/page-break-shortcut-in-ms-word/?utm_source=openai))\n\n**Mac:**  \nCommand + Enter ([umatechnology.org](https://umatechnology.org/keyboard-short-cut-keys-for-a-page-break/?utm_source=openai))\n\nIf by \u201chard page break\u201d you meant something else (programmatically, in code, on a typewriter, etc.), I can grab that info too."
    },
    {
        "role": "user",
        "content": "if%20I%20want%20to%20search%20in%20ms%20word%20for%20a%20hard%20return%2C%20I%20type%20%5Ep"
    },
    {
        "role": "assistant",
        "content": "In Microsoft Word, `^p` is indeed the Find/Replace code for a **hard return**, which is also known as a **paragraph mark**. ([brainbell.com](https://www.brainbell.com/tutorials/ms-office/Word/Find_Any_Character_Digit_Or_Letter.htm?utm_source=openai))\n\nHere are a few related special codes you might find useful:\n\n| What You Want to Find | Code in Find / Replace |\n|---|---|\n| Paragraph break (hard return) | `^p` ([learn.microsoft.com](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/answers/questions/4833350/why-cant-i-find-and-replace-hard-returns-in-word-2?utm_source=openai)) |\n| Manual line break (soft return, Shift+Enter) | `^l` (lowercase \u201cL\u201d) ([howtogeek.com](https://www.howtogeek.com/89577/how-to-search-for-line-breaks-tabs-and-special-characters-in-ms-word/?utm_source=openai)) |\n| Manual page break | `^m` ([brainbell.com](https://www.brainbell.com/tutorials/ms-office/Word/Find_Any_Character_Digit_Or_Letter.htm?utm_source=openai)) |\n\nIf you were asking about something slightly different\u2014like a \u201chard page break\u201d or something involving formatting codes\u2014just let me know and I can pull up those codes too."
    }
]